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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YERN B. l\IILLARD, 
Plaintiff and .Appellant, 
-YS.-
JESSE H. PARRY and ELSIE H. 
PARRY, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents, No. 8026 
STRAND ELECTRIC SERVICE 
C01IP ANY, a corporation, and 
OTTO DREWS, 
Defendants. 
Brief of Respondents 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, Jesse H. Parry was the owner of adja-
eeut premises at 160 and 162 South 13th East Street (R. 
606) and desired to construct an apartment at the rear 
of 160 South 13th East. The plaintiff, Vern B. Millard, 
a general contractor, called defendant Parry at his home 
about this construction and they met by appointment at 
the premises about the first week of November, 1950. 
Several days later defendant observed plaintiff and 
another person at the site and plaintiff introduced Mr. 
Leroy W. Johnson an architect to defendant. Johnson 
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snggl•sted llrawing a sketch for the premises which he 
did (Exs. 18, 19 and 20) (R. 608). These sketches were 
delivered to defendant about the first part of December, 
1950 and Johnson was employed as the architect. A few 
dayH later, .Johnson delivered three white sketches. (Ex. 
:~;>). At one of the early discussions plaintiff suggested 
building an additional six units on the front of 160 South 
13th East to match up with the new building. (R. 609). 
()u .January 8, 1951 defendant Parry notified Johnson 
that he could not make financial arrangements to build 
the additional six units on the front of the existing 
structure. (R. 764) About January 15, 1951 defendant 
had submitted to him a set of plans for the new 11 unit 
structure and the only change suggested in the plans 
was an entrance to the boiler room on the east side of 
the basement (Ex. P-5) which change was made and the 
plans returned to defendant. At the same time defendant 
was given a set of specifications, (Ex. 36) which plans 
(Ex. P-5) and specifications (Ex. 36) defendant Parry 
has had in his possession ever since that time. 
On the 29th day of January, 1951 plaintiff and de-
fendant entered into a written contract for $82,000.00 
for the erection of an eleven unit structure. (Exs. P-6 
and D-7) (R. 20) These exhibits specified 25 sheets of 
drawings and specification sheets numbered through 57. 
Article 3 of the specifications detailed certain allowances 
for kitchen cabinets, ranges, refrigerators and lighting 
fixtures. (Ex. P-2), plaintiff's copy of plans is identical 
with defendants' copy of plans (Ex. P-5) excepting page 
20 of plaintiff's plans which was taken out by plaintiff 
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to be deliYered to a sub-contrador. Plaintiff's specifica-
tions (Ex. P-3) and defendants' specifications (Ex. D-36) 
are identical. 
Prior to the signing of the contract discussion was 
had as to the type of windows which were known as Pella 
units and provided for in the specifications (Exs. P-3 
and D-36) at page 19 which provided: 
·'windows; shall be Pella Units as called for on 
plans to be installed according to the manufac-
turers direction as part of the carpentry con-
tract.'' 
The specifications (Ex. P-3) at page 34, under the head-
ing ''utilities'' provides: 
"provide all necessary material and labor for the 
installation of a 4 inch diameter soil pipe sewer 
from the building and connecting to the city sewer 
as shown on the plot plan.'' 
Johnson testified that it was anticipated that there 
would be a complete system of waste and vent piping and 
connected to the sewer system of Salt Lake City (R. 357) 
and that there would be a water system connecting the 
11 unit apartment to the Salt Lake City water system. 
(R. 358) 
At a trial of Johnson vs. Parry in December, 1951, 
the exhibits in that case No. 94041 were withdrawn and 
reintroduced in this action as Exhibits P-4, 6, 17, 18, 19, 
20, 21 and 36. Exhibit P-4 consists of 4 white sheets and 
1 yellow sheet bearing various dates in January, 1951. 
The 4th white sheet of Ex. P-4 shows itemized computa-
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tions of Johnson of 150 feet of sewer pipe at $2.20 per 
foot anti 150 feet of water service at 35c per foot, while 
the yellow sheet of Ex. P-4 includes a statement "this 
does not include sewer or water meter service.'' Exhibit 
P-4 was never ~een by defendant until December, 1951 
in ea~e No. 94041 and was obtained by Johnson and pre-
~L·nted to plaintiff for his use iu bidding. 
About J auuary 1, 1951 defendants Parry, at the re-
quest of Johnson, made selection of colors and sizes in 
plumbing fixtures (R. 786). About January 15, 1951, 
Johnson and 2\irs. Parry went to the Flint Distributing 
Company to look at metal cabinets, refrigerators and 
stoves. ( R. 787) The plumbing fixtures selected were 
specified in the specifications at page 35 and an allowance 
for kitchen cabinets, ranges and refrigerators selected 
was made within article 3. (Exs. P-6 and 7.) 
On February 3, 1951 plaintiff filed a set of specifi-
cations (Ex. D-37) and plans, (Ex. D-38) and an appli-
cation for a permit (Ex. D-39) with the Salt Lake City 
Building Engineer, and on February 5, 1951 a building 
permit to plaintiff was issued upon the aforesaid filing. 
The exhibits filed for the permit are identical with plans 
and specifications in the possession of both plaintiff and 
defendant. 
Shortly after plaintiff commenced work, the Pella 
\Vindow units were delivered to the site and stored in 
the garages on the premises, and plaintiff obtained Ex-
hibit D-15 which is a detail of the Pella unit casement 
window, which exhibit was posted in the work office of 
plaintiff on the construction site. 
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The first difficulty arose at the time the floor joists 
on the first floor were in place in April when it was dis-
covered that the floor joists on .the east side of the apart-
ment ran in the wrong direction and that the metal air 
ducts could not be hidden in the floor joists which rt>-
quired that the ceiling be furred down which defendant 
objected to both to Johnson and plaintiff and this work 
was halted for a two-day period, but plaintiff's workmen 
were placed on other work at the site. 
About July 19, 1951, Johnson, the architect, termi-
nated his services with the defendant at which time 
plaintiff and defendant discussed completion of the 
structure. Defendant Parry testified as follows: 
"Q. What was said? 
A. .Mr. Johnson had terminated his services and 
I talked, when I talked to Mr. Millard about it 
and he said he was going to make the building 
go ahead, he wasn't going to let it stand still, he 
was going to continue to build, that I wouldn't 
have nothing but a shell. I talked to Mr. Millard 
about it and he said that we could work together 
and get this building Celllpleted, which we did. 
Q. Was any financial arrangements made with 
reference to that conversation~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. As to how ~Ir. :\Lillard would be paid~ 
A ... Yes sir. 
Q. All right. Just tell us what the conversation 
was~ (R. 623) 
A. At that time I had paid l\Ir. Millard up to 
the contract price where we was withholding the 
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ten pcn·put. I told ~lr . .?\Lillard if he would con-
tinue ou with me I would start paying him the 
ten pPrecnt that we was withholding from the 
('Ott1rad price. (H. 624) 
At the signing of the contract, January 29, 1951, it 
wa:-; agn'l'U between plaintiff and defendant that any 
extras or additions requested by defendant were to be 
(·ha rged upon a cost plus 10% basis. 
~nh:-;<:(tuent to architect J olmson leaving the project 
and on completion of the interior rough finish and inser-
tion of the window units it was discovered hy defendant 
that the outside brick walls, shown on the plans to be 13 
inches, had been reduced to 10 inches on the main floor 
and 8 inches on the top floor. Defendant complained to 
plaintiff that he had not followed the plans and specifi-
cations of the brick walls. Plaintiff claimed that he bid 
upon the structure upon that basis of standard walls on 
the instruction of the architect without defendant being 
advised of any such change and which construction re-
sulted in a half window sill on the main floor and no 
window sill on the top floor. 
Construction in the wash and locker room required 
plastering of that room which was left out of the plans 
and which Johnson had agreed was his error and for 
which he \Vould be liable, and defendant ordered the 
work done. (Ex. 30.) 
In placing the cabinets in the north basement apart-
ment it was discovered that they extended ovev the end 
of the wall about one foot due to an error of computation 
of the architect. Defendant ordered the wall extended 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to accommodate the en binets as an extra and this change 
was made in three of the apartments. Additional cabinets 
in the west three apartments were ordered and billed 
as extras. 
'J.1he refrigerator~, ranges and cabinets selected by 
defendant were delivered to plaintiff who stored them 
in his personal garage awaiting installation. Five of 
the refrigerator doors opened the wrong way and two 
of these fin-' refrigerators had to be exchanged for 
smaller ones as the refrigerator space, when constructed, 
was not large enough to accommodate the refrigerator 
previously chosen. 
Changes were made on the bedroom closets from 
single doors to full length sliding doors and billed and 
admitted as extras. Changes were made in the three 
west apartments in planter box partitions from corru-
gated glass to louvered corrugated glass, which changes 
were requested hy defendant as extras. 
Defendant selected color and style of linoleum in-
cluding certain striping. The installation of the linoleum, 
however, without request of defendant was coved at the 
edges instead of using base board and round lumber. 
During the entire construction, additional work on 
the premises at 160 South 13th East and 162 South 13th 
East were made by plaintiff which were billed as extras 
on a basis of cost plus 10%. 
During the employment of the architect until about 
.July 19, 1951, billings for the work as it progressed were 
made in accordance "·ith the terms of the contract by 
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the arehiteet for the account of plaintiff. rrhe draws on 
eoutract commenced March :2, 1951 and continued through 
draw No. 6 dated ,July 5, 1951. Billings were then made 
by plaintiff direct to defendant on August 1, 1951, Sep-
tPrnher ;,, l!J;>] and November 1, 1951. Extras were 
billed direet hy plaintiff to defendant commencing Aug-
u~t 30, 1951. All of the above items being shown in 
EJxhihit P-13 m; follows: 
Draw Draw Amount of Payment Payment Payment 
~o. Date Draw To Date Amount 
$ 4,285.92 Johnson 
Supply Co. 2-19~51 $ 4,285.92 
2 3-2-51 $ 6,589.06 Vern B. 
Millard 3-5-51 $ 6,589.06 
3 4-2-51 $17,221.12 Vern 
:Millard 4-5-51 $17,221.12 
4 5-1-51 $ 9,161.39 Vern B. 
:Millard 5-3-51 $ 9,161.39 
5 6-1-51 $12,704.17 Vern B. 
Millard 6-5-51 $12,704.17 
6 7-5-51 $14,934.77 Vern B. 
:Millard 7-5-51 $14,934.77 
6 8-1-51 $ 7,727.88 Vern B. 
:Millard 8-3-51 $ 7,727.88 
7 9-3-31 $ 6,635.00 Vern B. 
:Millard ( 9- 6-51 $ 4,500.00 
(10-10-51 $ 2,135.00 
Total $79,259.31 
Billing November 1, 1951 as follows : 
Contract price $82,000.00 
Paid to date 76,785.43 
Balance on con tract $ 5,214.57 
Paid on extras $942.96 
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P .A Yl\I"FJXT rro I\£ILLARD - EXTRAS 
St>pt. 1~, 19.J1 Yern B. 1\1illard - extra $942.86 
P A Y~IENrr~ TO l\IILLARD 
AXD ~lTBCONTRACTOR 
NoY. 8,1951 Yern B .. Millard & 
\Yilliams Building Supply $1,852.88 
Nov. 8,1951 \ 7 t>nt B .. Millard & 
\Yilson Tile Co. 1,500.00 
NoY. 8,1951 \Tern B. l\Iillard & 
Ben E. Berger 1,030.70 
Nov. 8,1951 Y ern B. l\Iillard & 
Ernest E. Hank 470.00 
Nov. 28, 1951 Ludlow Plumbing & 
Vern i\Iillard 1,157.17 
Jan.11,1952 Johnson Supply Co. 500.00 
Jan.31,1952 Johnson Supply Co. 426.89 
$6,937.64 
RECAPITULATION 
Paid to :Millard $79,259.31 
Paid to :Millard & Subcontractors 6,937.64 
Paid to :Millard - extras 942.86 
Billing No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
$87,139.81 
BILLINGS FOR EXTRAS 
Date Items Billed Amt. of Billing 
8-30-51 1-8 Inc. $1,524.39 
10-26-51 9-22 Ine. 2,902.34 
10-30-51 23-35 Inc. 3,168.98 
11- 1-51 36 386.72 
11- 5-51 37 and 38 717.16 
11-13-31 39 and 40 288.23 
$8,987.82 
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Of the first 40 items of extras last billing November 
1 :;, 1 !);>:2, 11 \\'Pre disputed in the sum of $3435.14 as 
l1eing- it t•m:-; iil<'luded in the contract, and the defendant 
admit it'd t hl· halau('e of the items of extras in the sum 
of $4381.87. 
l\ :-; :-;hown 111 the pnor schedule, defendant Parry 
paid to plaintiff ~~ illard and sub-contractors between 
X ovember 8, 1951 and January 31, 1952, the sum of 
*(),!);J7 .64 and in addition thereto claimed a credit of 
$1 ~15.:32 which he had expended for connecting the sewer 
to the city system. 
Thus the contention of defendant Parry as to the 
status of payment on the contract as of February 1, 1952 
showed as follows: 
Contract price 
Admitted extras in items 1 to 40 
Payment to :Millard 
Paid to ~Iillard and 
Sub-contractors 
Paid to :Millard on extras 
Claimed credit for sewer 
connection 
$79,259.31 
6,937.64 
942.86 
1,215.32 
$88,355.13 
RFJCAPITULATION 
Cw1tract plus extras 
Payments and credit 
$82,000.00 
4,381.87 
$86,381.87 
$86,381.87 
88,355.13 
Claimed overpayment to Feb. 1, 1952 $ 1,973.26 
10 
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Items 41 to 60 inclusive for extras in the sum of 
$13,7:1."l.79 (Ex. P-1-J.) wt>re introduced and claimed in 
~Iarch, 1953 during trial of this action. Of i terns 41 to 
60, certain items were admitted by defendant Parry and 
others questioned as in the previous billings as being 
included within the contract price. 
About October 15, 1951 defendants Parry went to 
the office of plaintiff Vern B. l\filln rd and the following 
conversation was had: 
"Q. "Thy did you go to the office at that par-
ticular timeT 
A. \Yell, there were so many demands on the 
job for payments of sub-contractors that Mr. 
:Millard had not been paying his draws on us, we 
would ask for a lien waivers and he promised 
them and promised them and wouldn't give them 
to us on all this money and we gave him, so we 
demanded that we go to his office and settle this 
and find out who he owed, what it was, if we could 
settle it in a nice manner. And Mr. Anderson 
couldn't come to the terms of what we had paid. 
(R. 628) 
Q. \¥hat was said~ 
A. Well, there was many things said. 
Q. Let's have them. 
A. Well, we wanted lien waivers for these sub-
contractors we had paid, advanced Mr. Millard 
this money on, and he couldn't produce them for 
us and he says, ''by the time I get through with 
you I will file so many liens on you that your head 
will swim.'' 
THE COURT: He said what~ 
11 
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A. I'll file so many liens on you that your head 
will swim. 
rrHI~ COURrr: Who said that 1 
. \. l\1 r. Millard, sir, and at that time it was get-
ting so my wife and I, we just decided we couldn't 
do anything with ~~ r. Millard on this billing. I 
said if he could furnish me a list of people that 
hadn't IH~t>ll paid we would try and pay them, that 
we would try and settle this in the best manner 
we possibly could ourselves and walked out of his 
office. 
(l. X ow, in accordance with, or after that conver-
sation, did you then go to certain of the sub-
contractors, or those that were making demands 
upon you to Yerify the amounts that they were 
( R. 629) yet to be paid ~ 
A. Yes sir. (R. 630) 
Q. X ow after the conversation you had at Mr. 
Millard's office, I will hand you what is marked 
for identification as Exhibit P-8 and will ask you 
just where you saw that! 
A. l\Ir. :Millard handed this to me at the property 
site. 
Q. And the notations which you have made are 
those your notations? 
A. Yes sir. (R. 631) 
Q. I will ask you if at any time you requested 
an itemized statement of all costs on this job 2 
A. No sir. 
Q. I will hand you now what is Exhibit P-9 and 
ask you where you first got that? 
A. It was sent by the mail to my home. (R. 632) 
12 
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Thi8 Exhibit P-9, dated December 28, 1951, claimed 
that there was a balancP due of $24,75~.~)1 upon a cost 
plus 10% contract. 
Plaintiff filed his notice of lien on the above amount 
on January 8, 1952 and commenced this action July 14, 
1952 in which the defendants were the Parrys, Strand 
Electric Service Company and Otto Drews who all filed 
answers and cross complaints. Sub-contractor Balmforth 
filed a separate suit based upon a lien which was case 
X o. 96104 and which was consolidated with this action 
for trial. 
Plaintiff admitted at trial that the amount of the 
liens and sub-contractor claims aforesaid were included 
within his amount then claimed due from Parry. The 
basis of the suit against Parrys by the sub-contractors 
was for his failure to require plaintiff to file a Statutory 
Performance Bond. 
During the course of trial it was stipulated between 
all the parties that upon determination by the Court of 
various amounts due and owing lien claimants, that upon 
the payment of said determined amounts, credit would 
be given in the judgment to be entered in this action. 
On April 10, 1953 plaintiff and defendant entered 
into a stipulation that the entire sum found due the lien 
claimants Strand Electric Service Company, John Lee 
Floor Coverings and Otto Drews in the aggregate sum 
of $4,338.47 could be paid by the defendant Parry who 
would be entitled to a credit in the action and that upon 
payment of the claims the various actions and claims of 
the lien claimants would be dismissed. 
13 
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1'he Court determined that the defendant was liable 
in the total sum of $92,658.30 which included items of 
t·xtras ~os. 41 to 60 introduced at time of trial and that 
t'rt•dit for payments made on account and a credit for 
sl'\\'l'l' awl brick together with the payment of the three 
lien c·laimantH was the sum of $93,093·.60 which made an 
o\·(·rpa~·mPilt ou the part of defendant in the sum of 
::q;~:->.:m in this aetion and for which judgment against 
plaintiff was entered. 
POINT I. 
THE JUDGMENT AXD DECREE CONTAINS 
CONTRADICTORY PROVISIONS, AND DISMISSAL 
OF THE COUNTERCLAE\I PRECLUDED ENTRY 
OF A JUDGl\!ENT AGAIXST THE PLAINTIFF. 
This action proceeded to trial in consolidation with 
case No. 96104 upon the theory that stipulation be made 
between all of counsel as to the claims of defendants 
Strand Electric Service Company, Otto Drews and John 
Lee Floor Covering in the consolidated case and that 
the amount of their claims would be admitted and that 
it would then be determined by the Court what part, if 
any of said claims, was chargeable to the plaintiff or the 
defendants. 
This position is evidenced by statement in the record 
by defendant's counsel (R. 96): 
"I am sure that my client feels that we do not 
wish any judgment going against the property 
and we want the liens released, so I believe satis-
14 
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factory judgment can be made which will obviate 
the necessity of rendering any findings as to the 
matter. I don't want a. judgment entered on this 
matter until the entire matter is completed." 
After the trial of this rna tter and on the lOth day 
of April, 1953 counsel for parties involved in these 
actions stipulated (R. 55) : 
'' 5. That as to the particular portions of said 
claims so paid with respect to which it shall 
finally be adjudged that plaintiff is liable, said 
defendants Jesse H. Parry and wife shall be 
entitled to credit in the above entitled cause as 
of the date payment of claims is made (which 
credit shall be in addition to the payment here-
tofore made to plaintiff andjor to materialmen or 
subcontractors). 
* * * * * 
7. That upon payment of said claims the actions 
and counterclaims of said claimants are to be 
dismissed with prejudice.'' 
All of the above claims are included in the billing 
of plaintiff to defendants (Ex. P -9) bearing date of 
December 28, 1951. No further claims of Millard were 
made upon defendant Parry until trial when Exhibit P-14 
in an additional sum of $13,735.79 was made and a 
further claim made during the course of the trial in the 
amount of $3,212.00 (R. 498): 
"Q. Are you claiming that the item of $3,212.00 
is an additional charge by reason of not proceed-
ing with the construction? 
THE COURT: Which item? 
15 
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Q. It isn't shown on here. It isn't shown as an 
extra. It is an item of damage that would come 
by failure to go ahead with this after getting him 
to go ahead with his figure. 
A. I felt that I was damaged that much. 
THE COURT : How much is it' 
A. Thirty-Two Hundred Dollars and Twelve-
! mean $3,212.00. '' 
Thus, the additional claims were made by plaintiff 
against Parry during trial and would have to be con-
sidered as a counter-claim to the counter-claim which 
the defendant had filed against plaintiff. 
Therefore an examination of the record does dis-
close that the plaintiff made counter claims against the 
counter claim of the defendant Parry and the statement 
in the judgment of the Court is not in error. 
Based upon the aforesaid statements and stipula-
tions the Court tried this action item by item allowing 
certain credits to defendant Parry for payments as being 
items included in the contract of January 29, 1951 and 
allowing plaintiff other items for extras based upon the 
$82,000.00 contract such that after defendant Parry paid 
the lien claimants $4,338.47 there was an excess of pay-
ments credited to Parry in the sum of $435.30 for which 
he was entitled to a judgment under the terms of the 
stipulation of April 10, 1952. (R. 54-55.) 
Thus the provisions of the judgment are not contra-
dictory nor void. 
16 
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POINT II. 
THE ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO RE-
LEASE IIIS LIEN \VAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
The Court in its Judgment determined that the 
$82,000.00 contract dated January 29, 1951 between 
plaintiff and defendant was in effect and was changed 
only by an agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
on the termination of the services of the architect that 
the structure would be completed with plaintiff billing 
defendant, after July 19, 1951, for monthly balance and 
including the 10% which had previously been withheld 
under the terms of the contract. Exhibit 13 which is all 
of the billings and payments discloses that commencing 
August 1, 1951 and subsequent billings on September 5 
and X ovember 1, 1951 were billed upon the basis of 
complete billing which included the 10% which had been 
previously withheld under architect's draws. 
Thus, under the contention of defendant that as of 
February 1, 1952 there was a claimed overpayment of 
$1973.26 there would be no justification for the plaintiff 
to have filed a lien claiming $24,752.91 (Ex. P-9) and 
therefore, there being no justification for the filing of 
the lien and as an incident of the judgment it was proper 
that the lien so filed should be released. 
The plaintiff was not placed in any unfair predica-
ment by reason of the Court ordering the release of the 
lien as he made no objection to that portion of the judg-
ment and allowed the Court to enter the judgment on 
April 23, 1953. 
17 
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It seems elemental that if the plaintiff :filed an im-
propl~r lien it would of necessity follow that a judgment 
1-m~t.aining the position of the defendant that the lien 
wa~ improper and it should be ordered released in the 
judgment. 
POINT III. 
rrHE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY PENAL-
IZED PLAINTIFF FOR THE DEFAULTS OF DE-
FENDANTS PARRY, BY DENYING PLAINTIFF 
INTEREST ON SU~IS FOUND TO BE DUE AND 
OWING FROM SAID DEFENDANTS, AND BY AL-
LOWING SAID DEFENDANTS INTEREST PAID 
TO THIRD PARTY OBLIGEES AFTER TRIAL. 
Argument of appellant that there was an unpaid 
balance of $24,752.91 is based upon a cost plus 10% basis 
contended by the appellant. 
Counsel for appellant at page 35 of his brief states: 
''The trial Court found by implication that only 
$3,803.17 was still due and owing as of the time 
of trial. Said indebtedness found by the Court 
to be owing from said defendants at the time of 
trial was not paid until after trial.'' 
This position is untenable for the reason, as before 
stated, that during progress of trial, Exhibit P-14 
claimed $13,735.79 additional as extras, items No. 41 to 
60 inclusive. Of said 20 items defendant admitted 9 and 
denied the balance. Including these items admitted, the 
Court found defendant chargeable with the sum of 
$3,781.50 (items 41 to 60 inclusive in Schedule R. 72-73) 
18 
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which are items never presented to defendant as extras 
until time of this trial. These items are then included 
in the amount of $92,658.30 found due on contract price 
plus extras. (R. 74.) Not having been billed for the 
items ±1-60 inclusive until progress of trial, defendant 
Parry should not be penalized if it was an error of 
judgment of plaintiff not to pay his sub-contractors for 
work which they had performed and about which the 
three lien claimants participated in this trial. 
rrhis sum of $3781.50 was thus discharged as per 
stipulation (R. 54-55) by Parry paying the three lien 
claimants during trial the sum of $4338.47 which created 
an overpayment by Parry of $435.30 for which he was 
given judgment by the Court. 
Thus the findings of fact and conclusions of law are 
substantiated by the aforesaid facts. 
Defendant found himself in the position of having 
demands made upon him by various sub-contractors 
around October 1, 1951 for payments of accounts which 
plaintiff had failed to pay, with the result that defendant 
went to plaintiff's office about October 15, 1951 for the 
purpose of confirming payments which he had made on 
account of any balances which might be due to sub-
contractors who were making demands upon defendant 
for payment. As a result of this conference defendant 
received on the site Exhibit P-8 which was a statement 
of total costs of the construction and from which state-
ment he had to determine unpaid balances to various 
sub-contractors where payments were justly due and 
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plaintiff had not paid, in order to prevent filing of liens 
of certain sub-contractors. It is interesting to note that 
the item of the Johnson Building Supply Company on 
Exhibit P-8 is the sum of $21,219.20 from which it was 
determined by defendant Parry that there was a balance 
due said company of $926.89 which item was paid by 
two checks dated January 11, 1952 and January 31, 1952. 
These payments prevented the filing of a lien by said 
Johnson Building Supply Company as was likewise the 
case of payments made to Williams Building Supply, 
Wilson Tile Company, Ben E. Berger, Ernest E. Hank 
and Ludlow Plumbing Company between November 8 
and November 28, 1951 in an aggregate sum of $6,010.75. 
The statement attached to letter of attorney for appel-
lant to defendant (Ex. P-9) discloses that the amount of 
the same Johnson Building Supply Company was the 
sum of $15,162.02 such that the subsequent billing (Ex. 
P -9) of the same account is $5,057.18 less than the pre-
vious billing of the same account on Octo her 30, 1951 
(Ex. P-8). 
Exhibit P-9 was the first knowledge that defendant 
had that this construction was being billed upon a cost 
plus 10% basis and was over 1¥2 months after the last 
work was performed upon the job. 
The position taken by the trial Court is most aptly 
presented by a statement made by the Court at the 
conclusion of the trial and during argument of counsel 
(R. 922): 
''Here is another thing that is very persuasive 
in this matter. Mr. Millard's billing, from his own 
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billing, ran into November, which was he was 
proceeding under this contract with extras. Now, 
that is a Yery persuasive thing in a dispute like 
thi~, where it is left to believe one witness against 
the other. 
You have the accounts of Mr. Anderson and Mr . 
.\[illard 's billing of these people ran into N ovem-
ber, and after they have completed this job, which 
under the contrart showed balances under the 
contract and for extras. That is just one item 
that is very persuasive. Then, of course, I will 
say this, that in these plans and these specifica-
tions, these things that are in dispute between 
you, these points are provided for, and to avoid 
the provision of those plans and specifications 
you have got to create a side verbal understanding 
here, and in the light of the fact that there is a 
strong dispute between these people that such a 
thing occurred, and as I say, going back to this, 
in the light that you have Mr. Millard billing 
these people up to and after the contract is done, 
on a contract and extra basis, now Mr. Reimann, 
if you were in my position you just could not 
simply say, in the light of that, you would dis-
regard that." 
Thus, it seems elemental that all extras due lien 
claimants having been charged against defendant, he 
would be entitled to full credit for all payments made 
lien claimants. 
Counsel refers on page 41 of his brief to the per-
centages of costs charged by lien claimants. The sum 
of $42. 7:J was charged against defendant in the judg-
ment found, thus he again should be entitled to credit 
for amount paid to lien claimants. 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR TO ALLOW THE DEFAULT-
ING DEBTORS ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, 
AND ALSO ERROR TO DENY THE PLAINTIFF 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
At page 42 of appellant's brief counsel states: 
''Even the trial Court found that there was a 
principal amount of $3,803.17 still due and owing 
after allowing every possible credit.'' 
Counsel for appellant's computation of the amount 
found due at trial differs from this counsel who computes 
the figure at $3, 781.50. This figure as stated in the pre-
vious point consists of items numbered 41 to 60 (Ex. 
P-14) which are extras claimed during trial aggregating 
in all $13,735.79 of which the Court allowed the afore-
said figure of $3781.50. None of these items of extras 
totaling $3781.50 were ever presented to defendant until 
the 3rd day of trial of this action. 
Appellant's counsel refers to Exhibit P-9 dated 
December 28, 1951 which defendant Parry testified he 
receiYed about January 4, 1952 and was the first notice 
he had ever received that he owed a purported balance 
of $24,752.91 by reason of the construction contract 
being a cost plus 10% contract. 
Counsel for appellant gave great latitude of discre-
tion to defendant on this $24,752.91 claim by filing notice 
of lien in the office of the County Recorder of Salt Lake 
County on the claim on January 8, 1952 - four days 
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after defendant had rect'in~d counsel's letter with state-
ment at taehed. 
It is true enough that defendant could have paid 
plaintiff $:24,73:2.91 as demanded and then have turned 
around and sued for the determination of credits which 
plaintiff would not allow, but defendant deemed it not 
advisable on advice of counsel. 
Counsel for appellant seems to forget that this action 
which he commenced was based upon the foreclosure of 
a lien on a contract claimed to be on a cost plus 10% 
basis and that when the trial Court determined appel-
lant's contention was not correct, his suit would fail and 
the defendant would be entitled to his costs. 
POINT V. 
PLAIXTIFF REDUCED HIS BID TO $82,000.00 
I~ RELIAXCE ON THE DIRECTIONS OF THE 
ARCHITECT FOR OMISSION OF CERTAIN ITEM:S, 
AND ALSO ON THE PROMISE OF ARCHITECT 
SUPERVISION AND NON-INTERFERENCE BY 
0\VNERS, AND ON THE REPRESENTATION THAT 
ADDITIONAL CONSTRUCTION WAS BEING-
AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, SO THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS NOT BOUND WHEN DEFENDANTS DISRE-
G.ARDED THE CONTRACT AND DEPRIVED THE 
PLAINTIFF OF A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF 
i& CONSIDERATION FOR WHICH HE BARGAINED. 
Jri~ 
~ The first problem raised under this point is argued 
~r by counsel for appellant with utter disregard to the 
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teHtimony in this action as to the acquisition of materials 
on t lw part of defendant. 
rrhe tPHtimony shOWH that the Pella window units 
were ordered and plaintiff was so advised at all times 
and plaintiff had ample knowledge of this fact within 
the HJH'<'ifi<"atious (Ex. P-3) page 19 where the specifi-
t·a t iou~ state: 
''Windows; shall be Pella units as called for on 
plans to be installed according to the manufac-
turer's direction as a part of the carpentry con-
tract.'' 
Plaintiff was advised as to the plumbing material 
which is set out in the specifications (Ex. P-3, page 35). 
It is interesting to note that the 4th page of Exhibit 
P-4 includes figures admitted by Johnson himself to 
include computations of cost for sewer and water service 
in the sum of $5667.00 which is the figure which plaintiff 
used in his bidding on the job. This exhibit was at all 
times in the possession of the plaintiff until it became 
an exhibit in December, 1951 in Case No. 94041 and 
which this defendant withdrew in order to introduce in 
this action. 
Plaintiff's witness Johnson who was the architect, 
admitted upon cross examination that with reference to 
Exhibit P-4 he had in mind sewer pipe and water pipe 
to be included in the contract (R. 372, 374). This witness 
further admitted that the specifications used on this job 
(Ex. P-3) provided for water service and connecting a 
sewer system. (R. 357-358). Further, witness admitted 
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that he never mentioned to defendant the change in 
thickness of outside walls from 13 inch walls showed in 
the plans to walls of 9 inch in thickness including plaster, 
on the top floor. (R. 369). This change was stated by 
the witness not to be material even though it left the 
upper floor of the structure without any window sills. 
\Yitiwss further stated that the last two pages of the 
plans (Ex. P-2) plaintiff's copy, (Ex. P-5) defendants' 
copy and (Ex. D-38) Salt Lake City Building Engineer's 
copy were drawn the last part of February, 1952, (R. 
386) after the signing of the contract but Exhibit D-38, 
discloses that the last two sheets which are identical with 
defendants' copy (Ex. P -3) were part of the plans filed 
on February 3, 1952 for the purpose of obtaining a build-
ing permit. This ·witness further testified that $82,000.00 
was a just and reasonable fee for the construction of 
these 11 units (R. 387). 
Plaintiff being a general contractor of great experi-
ence could very early in the progress of construction 
have terminated the contract while there was still archi-
tectural supervision if the interference of the defendants 
Parry was causing undue loss of time and overhead. 
Plaintiff further could have refused to have continued 
construction about July 19, 1951 when the services of 
the architect were terminated and the best answer to 
the problem is incorporated within the physical proper-
ties of Exhibit P-13 showing a billing on a contract and 
extra basis after completion of the work and payments 
having been made by defendant under those billings. 
Defendants Parry Yisited the site on their way to 
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work in the morning for about 15 minutes and then re-
tunwd to the Hite on their way home from work and 
aftpr plaintiff's workmen had left the job so that there 
eould not ha\·t~ been a wholesale loss of time due to owner 
iHterference. 
POINT VI. 
EV11~~ IF THE CONTRACT WERE NOT VOID-
ABLE, IT UOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED TO RE-
QUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FURNISH ITEMS IN EX-
CESS OF THOSE ON' WHICH THE ARCHITECT 
AS AGENT OF OWNERS INSTRUCTED PLAIN-
TIFF TO BASE HIS BID, AND PLAINTIFF IS 
THEREFORE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ADDI-
TIONAL SUMS. 
The specifications for this job heretofore referred 
to specifically required the construction and connection 
to the Salt Lake City sewer and upon refusal of plaintiff 
to connect to the sewer, defendant was required to have 
this work done which cost $1215.32. (Ex. 42-43.) The 
master plot plan repeatedly referred to in appellant's 
brief was never seen b~· defendant until the trial of 
Johnson vs. Parry in December, 1951, which is the exhibit 
introduced by Johnson himself and is one of the exhibits 
withdrawn from that case for use in this action. This 
master plot plan drawn in April, 1951 indicated running 
the sewer directly to the east for connection with the 
sewer at 13th East which was impossible for when Salt 
Lake City Building Engineer staked out the location for 
the sewer it had to be cut diagonally across the front of 
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the premises at 160 So. 13th East in order to have the 
~·wwer flow by gravity, there being a 16 foot difference 
in height between where the master plot plan showed a 
connection and where it actually had to be connected. 
POINT VII. 
THE PURPORrrED AGREE~IENT WHICH THE 
COURT FOUXD \VAS ::\IADE ON JULY 19, 1951, IS 
CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND WOULD 
DEPRIVE PL~-\.IXTIFF OF THOUSANDS OF DOL-
LARS vVITHOUT CONSIDERATION. 
As to this point plaintiff contends that if the con-
tract of January 29, 1951 were not abrogated prior to 
the termination of the services of the architect about 
July 19, 1951, the contract was then abrogated for failure 
of defendant to employ another architect. 
Plaintiff, at the termination of the services of the 
architect, had a legal right to terminate the contract at 
that point if he so desired. Instead of terminating the 
contract, every intendment of the evidence, particularly 
Exhibit P-13 billings and payments, shows that after 
Johnson left as architect the plaintiff billed Parry for 
the full amount expended during each billing period 
which included the 10% being withheld until completion 
under the terms of the contract and these billings were 
paid by defendant. 
At page 77 of appellant's brief the statement IS 
made: 
"the billings by ::\Ir. l\Ellard were on the basis 
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of cost plus 10% from and after August 1, 1951 
(See Ex. P-13)" 
'rhis exhibit shows the contract billings direct by 
plaintiff to defendant under date of August 1, 1951, 
September 5, 1951 and the last billing dated November 1, 
1951 iH as follows: 
''Contract price 
Paid to date 
Balance on contract 
Paid on extras 
$82,000.00 
76,785.43 
5,214.57 
$942.96 
At the date of this last billing there had been only 
one billing of extras, of eight items dated August 30, 
1951 on which the last contract billing indicated a pay-
ment of $942.96, which is the payment for extras not 
disputed. The disputed items being questioned as being 
items included within the contract. Subsequent billings 
on extras continued to November 13, 1951 through item 
40 showing a total on the last billing of $7,473.43. 
Plaintiff himself was very uncertain as to when his 
supposed contract of cost plus 10% began as is shown 
by his testimony: 
'' Q. Did you proceed under the contract of 
January 29, 1951 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now how long did you continue under the 
terms of that contract~ 
A. Well, until along in the summer when I was 
picking up extras that went along that kept get-
ting more numerous and more numerous and then 
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I felt that the contract was not in effect any more. 
Q. And can you give me any ascertainment by 
month and date approximately when you consid-
ered that the job was changed from the contract 
of January 29th! 
~\. About July 1st. (R. 541} 
Q. Xow I will ask you the question again. Did 
you consider this structure to be upon a eost plus 
10% basis from the beginning of the work which 
was done at 160 So. 13th East? 
A. I will state that I was keeping extra costs in 
anticipation of using it as cost plus if they became 
and continued irregular. (R. 542) 
Q. Now you never made any statement to Mr. 
Johnson from January 29, 1951 until July 19, 1951 
with reference to the fact that it was on a cost 
plus 10% contract, did you 1 
A. No, but I was keeping the costs as they went 
along." (R. 543) 
The theory of a cost plus 10% contract was denied 
by Mr. Parry: 
'' Q. After January 29, 1951 did you ever enter 
into any contract with :\Ir. Vern B. Millard the 
plaintiff herein for a cost plus 10% contract for 
the erection of this 11 unit building~ 
A. At no time, I did not, sir. ( R. 622) 
It is the conclusion of the writer of this brief that 
:5~ Exhibit P-13 clearly discloses the fact that appellant 
.Millard recognized the cqntract of January 29, 1951 even 
I~ after leaving the premises on November 8, 1951 by billing 
1t~r extras as late as November 13, 1951. 
!tti: 
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POINT VIII. 
li'AILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT TO ALLOW 
EV~N AS EXTRAS, THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS 
O:F' ( 10STH INUURRED BY PLAINTIFF THROUGH 
rrHE CONDUCT OF DEFENDANrrs AND THEIR 
AHt'llFrECT, AMOUNTS TO UNJUST ENRICH-
l\1 ENT OF SAID DEFENDANTS. 
rl,he item of $3,212.00 mentioned on page 80 of ap-
pellant's brief and all of the items set forth in page 81 
of their brief are items which, as before stated, were 
introduced for the first time during the course of the 
trial, and the Court took the position that, having juris-
diction of the matter, he would consider those items, 
some of which were admitted as extras on the part of 
the defendant and others contested. It is here to be 
noted that the items set forth on page 81 of the brief 
were figures which were computed from memory during 
course of trial based upon the memory of Mr. Merrill, 
appellant's foreman in conference with appellant and his 
bookkeeper, Mr. Anderson, with no other evidentiary 
factor other than the estimation of Mr. Merrill. It is 
further to be noted that all items of billing for extras 
(Ex. P-13) were at cost plus 10% and in the final deter-
mination, appellant was given those items to which he 
was entitled on a basis of his cost plus 10% plus an addi-
tional 10% as a contractor's fee, the first 10% being 
considered overhead and therefore part of the cost. 
Thus appellant was given a sum of $389.28 additional on 
items 1 to 40 of extras billed up to November 13, 1951 
and $267.39 on items 41 to 60 which were extras intro-
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duced at the time of trial, making an aggregate sum of 
$656.67 the court allowed the appellant over the amount 
of his billings. 
It has repeatedly been admitted that specific changes 
were ordered by defendant for which he was billed as 
extra~. It is to be supposed that in discussing these 
changes some time element would be consumed with Mr. 
jfillard or his foreman and which specific extras were 
billed and paid for. 
At page 82 of his brief appellant states: 
"the allowance of $363.00 for item 60 on exhibit 
P-14 shows that the trial Judge recognized the 
fact that the owners did interfere and did make 
construction more costly.'' 
This item was billed at $2,420.00 for additional labor 
costs due to overtime, delays by changes not shown as 
extras and interference by owners. Mr. :Merrill, fore-
man for plaintiff, testified on this item that $300.00 was 
reasonable for overtime and the Court allowed that 
figure as his finding. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff in this 
action never did prove a cost plus 10% contract. 
The physical evidence discloses that plaintiff and 
defendant continued on the construction after the termi-
nation of the architect's services with owner super-
Yision. Billings at all times during architectural super-
vision were made monthly on the contract basis but with-
holding 10% for completion. Billings during owner 
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supervision were made on a contract basis but included 
the 10/'o withheld under architect's supervision and all 
billings for extras were made directly by plaintiff to 
dt>t'endant on a cost plus basis even to date subsequent 
to completion of the work. The last billing on the con-
t rnet was dated November 1, 1951 and was as follows: 
Contract price 
Paid to date 
Balante on contract 
Paid on extras 
$82,000.00 
76,785.43 
$ 5,214.57 
$942.96 
The first time defendant was advised that plaintiff 
was claiming this to be a cost plus job was when he was 
advised by counsel for plaintiff which letter and exhibit 
attached was received about January 4, 1952. Plaintiff 
then filed his notice of lien of January 8th claiming 
$24,7 52.91 still due and owing. 
The first question involved in this suit is whether 
or not the contract of January 29, 1951 was abrogated. 
The trial Court found that the physical evidence herein-
before referred dissipated such a situation. The second 
question involved was whether or not items billed as 
extras were properly extras or were they items included 
within the terms of the contract of January 29, 1951 and 
on this point the trial Court went into minute detail of 
each item claimed as extras on the part of the plaintiff 
other than those which were admitted by defendant and 
even including those items of extras numbered 41 to 60 
inclusive claimed during progress of trial. On these 
items claimed at trial the Court found, including items 
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~ admitted, the sum of $3,781.50 which was paid by de-
~ fendant under stipulation during trial to the three lien 
claimants in this action and by which defendant made an 
"" overpayment of $435.30 for which a judgment was en-
tered in his favor. 
Or.i 
;!~ 
t:.: 
-[)~; 
:cit 
~c 
:e:a:. 
~ 
~a:-
P' 
! ili~ 
it~ 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the trial 
Court should be affirmed in its judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE 
Attorney for Defendoots a;n.d 
Respondents Parry. 
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